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Why and Whither?
The Referendal “nos” of Spring 2005
A FEW MONTHS AFTER  the French and Dutch electorate rejected
the constitutional treaty,  it is time to analyze the results of the
June referenda and reflect on what they teach us about the
EU’s legitimacy predicament. We must first disentangle what
the “no” voters wanted to reject: their own government, “Eu-
rope” as they saw it, enlargement —since the phobia of the
outside ran deep, well beyond the now proverbial fear of the
Polish plumber. There were many “nos” and the French and
Dutch outcomes need not stem from the same political
dynamic. An understanding of the social bases of the vote is
thus also in order.
Paul Taggart provides such an analysis. Yves Mény and
Jos de Beus then discuss in more detail the significance of
the French and Dutch campaigns and electoral results both
for the countries themselves and for European integration.
George Ross concludes our Forum by arguing that the actual
crisis in the EU stems from the anxieties about the European
“social model” and notes the political difficulties that France
and Germany, the EU tandem of yesteryear, face when it
comes to reforming. Without growth and jobs, can there be a
legitimacy for the European project? Without national reforms
(EU-induced or otherwise), how do EU economies improve?
This is the current double-bind.
This is a lively Forum almost as passionate as the refer-
endum campaigns in France and the Netherlands. In fine,
our contributors agree on a few fundamental points:  in Paul
Taggart’s words, governments are bound to run into trouble
when they “suddenly switch to direct democracy to attempt
to ratify a complex treaty for a complex and unprecedented
polity.” The scholars in this Forum also all think that Europe
is now part of day to day politics. Yet this “domestication” of
the EU is taking place at a time when confidence in the
economy is poor, and trust in the political establishment  is
low. This is not perhaps what Winston Churchill had in mind
when hoping for Europe to be in the “hearts and minds” of
Europeans yet this may explain why the EU is not – except
in Spain and a few other places— to borrow from Ernest
Renan, “a daily plebiscite.”
          — Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor
The Politics of Bifurcation:The 2005 Referendums in
France and the Netherlands
Paul Taggert
THE REFERENDUM RESULTS in France and the Netherlands in
2005 show clearly that the politics of bifurcation are a real
problem both for advocates and for analysts of the European
project. What is extraordinary is that, when it comes to
European integration, we have a profoundly complex issue
and set of institutions and an issue directly involving large
numbers of people in diverse contexts, and yet we expect it
to fall into the two poles of ‘for’ and ‘against’. The votes
against the Constitutional treaty were neither evidence of a
growing monolithic Euroscepticism nor were they conclusive
proof that domestic politics trumps European issues when it
comes to national votes on Europe. They were part and parcel
of the interweaving of EU and domestic European politics.
The referendum results show that the European issue is
not becoming a fault line running through European politics
but rather a staple part of the diet of European politics. It is
becoming an issue like any other issue. We do not expect
populations to take ‘yes’ or ‘no’ positions on issues like taxation,
the welfare state or education. We expect people to take
complex positions about what sort of education, welfare state,
taxation they would like to see. And that is what we see with
the European issue. But when European publics are forced
into birfurcating their positions on European into ‘for’ or
‘against’ by politicians, they are clearly liable to express their
dislike of the people making them do this.
What the results demonstrate is that a project charged
with a democratic deficit can create as many problems for
itself when it injects a flurry of direct democratic moments.
The governments of 25 states universally use representative
democratic politics to run their own polities. Perhaps it is no
surprise that they run into difficulties when many of them
suddenly switch to direct democracy to attempt to ratify a
complex treaty for a complex and unprecedented polity.
The reasons that these two moments of apparent
Euroscepticism received such attention is that (a) they
occurred in the same period as part of the same ratification
process, (b) that the two states were founding EU states and
(c) that their collective result created such a headache for
those seeking to push the European integration project
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EUSA Review From the Chair
John T.S. Keeler
A Special Award for Jonathan Davidson
IT IS A PLEASURE to announce that, at our October 21 an-
nual meeting in Pittsburgh, the Executive Committee de-
cided to honor Jonathan Davidson with a special EUSA
Public Service Award.  Davidson, Senior Advisor for
Political and Academic Affairs at the Delegation of the
European Commission in Washington, will be retiring in
2006 after a distinguished career with the British Diplo-
matic Service (1963-1981), the University of South Caro-
lina (where he served as Director of the USC Washing-
ton Office 1981-1991) and the European Commission.
As Head of Academic Affairs at the Delegation since
1991, Davidson has worked tirelessly to promote the
study of the EU and trans-Atlantic relations at universi-
ties throughout the United States.  He has collaborated
with faculty coast to coast to organize scores of events
over the years, and has played a pivotal role in the de-
velopment of the EU Centers program since 1998.  I
know that many of our members join me in saying that
we will miss Jonathan’s unique combination of skill, dedi-
cation and charm.  We will make a formal presentation
of our award to him at our 2007 conference in Montreal.
Recognizing that our graduate students represent the
future of our profession, the ExCom also decided to make
every effort to increase funding for the Ernst Haas Me-
morial Dissertation Fellowships.  Two were awarded
this past year (from among forty-two applicants), and
we hope to continue awarding two or more in the future.
Please do consider making a donation to the Hass Fund
either now or when you renew your membership.  For
your convenience, our EUSA website will soon be
equipped to accept donations via credit card.
Another decision made at Pittsburgh was to locate
the EUSA conference for spring 2009 in Los Angeles,
California.  This will be only the second EUSA
conference ever held on the West coast; the first was
located in Seattle in 1997.  The ExCom expects to hold
the 2011 conference either on the East coast, with Boston
a strong possibility, or in Europe (possibly Brussels).  The
final decision on this matter will not be made until 2007,
so members have ample time to make their preferences
known.
Amy Verdun (University of Victoria) has agreed to
succeed Virginie Giraudon as editor of the EUSA Forum,
and Andy Smith (Institut d’Etudes Politique de Bordeaux)
has agreed to succeed Daniel Keleman as Book Review
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(continued from p. 1)  onwards. But the French and Dutch
referendums need to be seen in the context of the
referendums in Spain and Luxemburg that gave support to
ratification of the treaty. And they need to be seen in the
longer term as part of the process of normalisation of EU
politics which includes Danish, Irish and even previous French
referendum results, to say nothing of the nine referendums
held in the accession states in 2003.
In France1 the campaign appears to have generated real
discussion about Europe (or as Yves Meny puts it here ‘around’
Europe if not ‘on’ Europe). A country at the heart of the
European project and with apparently stable levels of support
for the European project appeared to generate public opinion
that was clearly volatile on the issue of the treaty. But the
referendum also showed us a population that saw Europe as
an issue salient enough to vote on.
National considerations did appear to drive ‘No’ voters.
But the sorts of national concerns were those that were due
to EU pressures - the perception that the treaty was too
‘liberal’ for France or too likely to contribute to French
unemployment. In this way EU issues and domestic issues
came together on the visions of which Europe there should,
or should not, be.
Those voting ‘Yes’ in France tended to come from well-
educated and well-off sections of society while the ‘No’ vote
drew from those from lower-income levels and in less stable
employment.  The social group that supported the treaty were
the professionals and executives. Catholics and Parisians were
also supportive. In the public sector 64 per cent were against
ratification.
In terms of the party alignment of French voters it is
clear that the ‘No’ side brought together those at the periphery
of the party system and those outside it. Exit polls showed
that the most consistently negative voters on the treaty were
those of the far left, the Communists, the far right and those
without party attachment. The paradox here is that the whole
push for a French referendum can be seen as a result of
conflict within and between the major parties of the centre
but that it was an alliance between voters aligned with
peripheral parties that determined the outcome of the
referendum.
The French referendum campaign and the result seems
to demonstrate that Europe was not a ‘second-order’ issue
in this instance. For those that campaigned for and against
and for those that voted for ratification, the issue was Europe.
The campaign was about European integration - or more
precisely about different visions of Europe. The most common
reasons for voting yes, according to exit polls, were that
ratification would shore up Europe’s position in the world
compared to other global players.
In the Netherlands2, the referendum seemed to create
turmoil in this country at the heart of the European project.
The political establishment uniformly supported the treaty and
the ‘No’ campaign brought together those on the peripheries
of the Dutch political system. Robert Harmsen describes the
‘No’ camp as a ‘patchwork of protest’ drawing together a
populist left, a populist right and the small traditional Protestant
parties. The arguments used against the treaty were disparate
but were (as Jos de Beus here points out) a repudiation of
the political establishment.
‘No’ voters were in a majority across all social groups
but higher education and higher income-levels seem to be
correlated with higher levels of support for ratification. In
age cohorts, only the over 65s had a majority of support.
Those voting against, in polls, tended to cite the Dutch budget
contribution as a key issue and after that were issues of
national influence and identity. Those voting for tended to
cite reasons such as cross-border capacity, international co-
operation and efficient European decision-making. Like its
French counterpart, the Dutch referendum does seem to show
that Europe was the issue and not simply a proxy for other
issues.
In terms of party affiliation, voters who supported the
Dutch government parties had a majority of voters for
ratification. The only other party with such a majority was
GreenLeft. The affiliations of the most ardently opposed were
with the Socialist Party, the Wilders Group, the Pim Fortuyn
List and the Christian Union. There was clearly an element
of protest at the domestic as well as European ‘establishment’.
The Dutch result bought together populist politics, protest
politics with real issues of European integration for the
Netherlands.
Why did the majority of French and Dutch voters reject
the treaty in their referendums? The inconvenient, messy,
but true answer seems to be that there were different reasons.
There are similarities between the French and the Dutch cases
but the most striking similarity is the heterogeneity of the
‘No’camps. There is no monolithic European (or Eurosceptic)
‘No’ camp.
True, there are some similarities that we might expect
(about education and income) but the arguments both for and
against were different with each country and were not the
same across both countries. In both cases, opposition came
from the peripheries (if not exclusively from there). But we
cannot even say the core of the political system was uniformly
supportive, at least in the French case. The reasons for
rejecting the treaty stem from specific national concerns about
the impact of European integration on domestic polities,
economies and societies. It is not a simple picture. It is not
one that lends itself to bifurcated analysis.
The picture of why there were two referendum rejections
of the Constitutional Treaty is not a simple one. It is not a
question of for or against, of Euroscepticism or Europhilia. It
is not a question of whether European or domestic factors
determined the results. It is not even a question of
establishment and protest. The real question is why we even
expect there would be a simple explanation. For advocates,
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bifurcated referendum politics of support or opposition is both
risky and liable to populist mobilisation against it. For those
seeking to analyse the European integration project, it
reinforces the fact that EU studies and European politics are
impossible to disentangle and that treating them as separate
spheres is untenable.
Paul Taggart is professor of Politics at Sussex
European Institute, Brighton, UK
Europe Bewildered, France Adrift
Yves Mény
So the guillotine of the “no” vote has fallen. Swiftly and
irredeemably. The French campaign steered well clear of
any kind of political debate. Even forgetting the mistakes, the
fudges and lies which have marked the  discussions which
have taken place around the treaty (rather than on the treaty),
one brutal fact is obvious: there has been an undeniable
expression of  populist, social conservatism in France.
In the past we had got used to the kind of flamboyant,
bantering populism so dear to Bernard Tapie, to the vociferous
protests of special interest groups (hunting and fishing) and
the rabble rousing of the far right (Le Pen). Now, here they
all were, united and re-invigorated in the cocktail shaker of
the “no” vote, bound together by the cement of an economic,
social and political conservatism which saw our frontiers as
simply letting in the barbarian and letting out our industry, our
identity, our values, our public services and our social system
which is-the-envy-of-the-whole-world.
The left wing “no” camp has yet to understand the
Pandora’s box which it has opened. In semantic terms, it has
achieved what the bulldozers sent in to demolish an immigrant
housing complex by a communist mayor achieved symbolically
some two decades ago.
Whether it likes it or not, by making a threat out of the
foreigner who is “invading” us, by stigmatizing the foreigner
who is stealing our jobs thanks to liberal policies, the left wing
“no” camp has given breathing space to a xenophobia which
was only waiting to claim  respectability on the left, because
it is an historical and factual error to think that stigmatization
of the foreigner is the exclusive prerogative of the reactionary
far right. Without questioning the good faith of the leaders of
the left wing “no” camp, they nevertheless seem to have
been rather quick to forget the existence of a concealed, but
all the more potent working class xenophobia, since the
struggle for employment places French born workers in direct
confrontation with foreigners. It wasn’t the bourgeoisie or a
few misled intellectuals who invented the equivalent terms in
French for “rag-heads”, ”eyeties” and “polaks”  These
discriminatory names were coined on building sites and in
urban ghettos.
Whether it likes it or not, the left wing “no” camp has
contributed to French paranoia, which sees the nation as a
besieged hexagon. The election campaign also revealed the
ignorance which exists concerning what is at stake
economically on a global scale and within Europe, which
ignorance, it must be said, has been deliberately encouraged
by almost all the political classes in France.
No one doubts that reform is difficult to achieve and that
it involves sacrifices, no more than the fact that people must
be provided with adequate social protection. But with the
notable exception of Nicholas Sarkozy, who has not hesitated
to call into question the excellence of an economic and social
system, which for the past thirty years has “guaranteed” 10%
unemployment, the rest of the leaders and the political parties
in France have been happy enough to keep churning out the
same old ideas.
Liberalism has become a mortal sin, as if we weren’t
living and working in a market economy. Delocalisations have
been presented as a detestable novelty which would be made
even worse by the treaty, whereas for the past forty years
the French government agency Datar has been organising
the arrival and funding of foreign companies wishing to locate
in France, for the benefit of the regions involved. While it is
true that delocalisations involve hardships which must be taken
into account, these cannot be prohibited by decree, unless
the aim is to establish a soviet-type economy.
For the European Union, the French “no” further
accentuates the mess which Europe finds itself in. Europe,
because it has expanded, because its institutions have not yet
adapted to the expansion, because the hopes invested in the
beneficial effects of the Euro have not yet materialised (for
want of the economic reforms which should have
accompanied its introduction), has no clear perspectives, nor
horizon, apart from further expansion (Bulgaria, Romania,
Croatia, Turkey).
The ratification process will continue until the autumn of
2006, while, after Germany, Poland, Italy and then France
will be in the throes of their own national elections. Clearly,
until 2007, any action by the European Commission will be
hindered by national political agendas and stultified by the
ratification procedures, to say nothing of a more profound
source of unease : the gradual transformation of the
Commission into a bureaucracy entangled in the management
of its financial and legal rules and restricted in its actions by
the refusal of governments to back the policies of the future
rather than those of the past.
Putting the Commission on the back burner in this way is
already producing certain effects : there are few new
initiatives under way; those already launched have been
placed on standby, or strongly contested, like the all too famous
Bolkestein  directive. As a result, the downstream  legislative
activity of the Parliament is dwindling; and at the rate at which
things are going, the Euro MP’s will soon be reduced to voting
resolutions concerning the sexual comfort of bees.
The “no” vote, regardless of its future impact on the
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opinion is not ready to pursue the European adventure without
being told more about its destination and its fellow travellers.
Already, a time bomb had been put in place during the last
revision of the Constitution in February 2005 : any new
expansion subsequent to those already under way (Bulgaria,
Romania) must now be subjected to a referendum. We cannot
predict the mood of the French people in five or ten years
time, but neither can we move ahead while blinding ourselves
to certain realities. Any new expansion, whether it concerns
the membership of Turkey or the Balkan states, will be very
difficult for French electors to approve.
This referendum has also shown to what extent existing
ambiguities concerning the nature and the purpose of the
European Union raise, or will continue to raise, question marks.
There are two opposite approaches, even if the dividing lines
are unclear: on the one hand the creation of a market which
would serve as a basis for more marked political ambitions;
on the other, a market which would limit itself to its own
ends.
In the first case, the economy would serve a European
policy; in the second, there would be a vast economic space,
protected from national politics. The second solution would
provide a reasonable response to the removal of economic
and social policies from the political sphere, in short, to the
“political disenchantment” of Max Weber.
But, as the French referendum shows - and not only the
French one – if you kick politics out of the door, it will come
back in through the window, and in this case, in the form of
the worst possible type of house breaking: the populist protest
movement is only too happy now and the construction of
Europe by subterfuge has achieved its aims.
In certain respects, the Constitutional Treaty is probably
the last of these misadventures and soon Europe will have to
make up its mind whether it wants to opt for a real Constitution
or make do with a simple free trade treaty. The second part
of the alternative is no doubt the most likely given that the
forces in favour of the first, already weakened, are no longer
capable of being a driving force: the Franco-German pairing
would be hard put to launch any ambitious project, even
supposing that the French people wanted them to do so!
France has already rejected, on many occasions, different
German advances favouring a more integrated Europe. It is
now unlikely that the German leaders would wish to come to
the help of a France still dreaming of endowing Europe with
the utopia of nationalised economies and the fading charms
of a maladjusted social security system.
The partisans of the “no” vote have woken up in a pile of
rubble : with a France which is inaudible and misunderstood
by its partners, forced, very late in the day, and at increasing
cost, to adapt itself to the requirements of the moment, if it
wishes to avoid an inexorable decline.
May 1950 to May 2005: it’s the end of an era. The modern
day peasant uprising of 29th May has revealed a major identity
crisis both within France and within Europe. Unfortunately,
what is to be feared is that this cry of distress, far from
resolving the problems faced by the French people, will
contribute even more to the break up of the European dream,
before it has had a chance to be realised.
Yves Mény is  President of the European University
Institute, Florence, Italy.  Translated into English by
Rodger Hickman.
A Dutch Correction of the European Way
Jos de Beus
On June 1, the Netherlands held its first national referendum
since modern statehood, founded in 1813. Although everyone
took volatility into account after the liquidations of the anti-
islamists Fortuyn and Van Gogh, everything about the Dutch
reception of the second constitutional treaty of Rome turned
out to be surprising.
The campaign was fierce, lively and enlightening,
compared to the slackness of earlier campaigns with respect
to EMU, the euro, and eastern enlargement. The turnout was
63 percent, much higher than recent and average Dutch
turnout in European Parliament elections. An overwhelming
majority of voters rejected the treaty (62 percent), with a
substantive share of young, less educated and female citizens.
This outcome was a major defeat of the yes camp, including
not only the center-right cabinet of Mr. Jan Peter Balkenende
(Christian democrats, conservative liberals, social liberals) but
also social democrats, greens, employers’ associations, trade
unions, leading newspapers, indeed the entire establishment
of the nation. The no camp of small parties won (radical
socialists, orthodox Christians with a leftist touch, right-wing
populists). It forced the government to call off the ratification
process in Brussels and to prepare an official national debate
on the final goal of European cooperation. That debate was
cancelled after the summer because of division within the
political élite as well as the shared fear that it would speed up
an ongoing self-delegitimisation of the EU.
Thus, a brief outburst of Euroscepticism made an end to
almost sixty years of permissive consensus in one of the oldest
small member states. How and why did it happen? What is
the next stage in Dutch politics of integration? What does it
mean for Europe?
Most politicians saw Giscard’s text as a codification of
the old and a compromise about the new. Its understanding
about European values, shared competences (rather than
pillars), simple rules of voting and decision-making, and
personal rights would by and large protect the stake of small
states. Nevertheless, a parliamentary majority decided to turn
Dutch consent at the level of states into a referendum issue
because it was sure about the constitutional dimension of the
treaty (binding citizens and peoples in an enlarged Union)
while being unsure about the degree of knowledge and
commitment of ordinary people in its own constituencies. The6     Fall  2005   EUSA Review
campaign itself was marked by a permanent lack of
coordination between the departments of foreign affairs and
domestic affairs and a dual dramatisation. The yes camp
argued that non-ratification implies the beginning of the end
of European peace and prosperity, while the no camp singled
out the beginning of the end of Dutch sovereignty and social
citizenship. Compared to the French campaign, most
discussants neglected the European ideal and alternative
models of future integration. Instead, they focused on the
Dutch pessimism about their society, government and common
future. The main objection against the constitution was that it
did not entail restrictions and incentives to stop European
rulers intervening too fast, too expensively, too often and too
deeply into the democratic community of the Dutch.
This recurring point in public debates resonated in the
hearts and minds of many voters. Most electoral studies to
date draw a pair of explanatory conclusions. On the one hand,
Dutch citizens prefer to continue European membership and
European integration, particularly in the new scope of security
(counter-terror, defence, foreign policy). They do not see the
current stagnation of European constitution making as a big
deal. On the other hand, they distrust the European mode of
representation in The Hague, other capital cities, Brussels,
Luxemburg and Strassburg. They complain about a lack of
basic information, loss of national sovereignty and identity,
rash reforms with a EU blessing under the leadership of
Balkenende (a conservative with fragile authority), unfairness
(concerning the net payer position of the Netherlands), and
visible failure of European projects and initiatives.
Mr. Bot, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs and former
member of Coreper, swears that the Netherlands will remain
a reliable European partner while it inserts a local moment of
painful reappraisal. My prediction for the short run is less
favorable. Domestic instability (a mixture of discord and
confusion) will spill over to instability of the Dutch course in
Europe as a mixture of standstill and obscurity. Dutch
policymakers now develop a European sur place agenda.
This agenda is an accurate reflex of Dutch dissatisfaction,
but is also a complex continuation of the EU crisis. It entails
prudent use of the rambling Treaty of Nice; temporary stops
of further enlargement (Bulgaria, Croatia, Rumenia, perhaps
even Turkey); a turn from new Commission projects to good
governance of old ones; priority for European growth and
employment; overhaul of international cost sharing (that is,
abolition of the Common Agricultural Policy); rethinking the
place of national social policies, public services, associations
and merit goods (cultural heritage) in a unified economic space;
and strengthening the vigilance and supervision of national
parliaments.
Dutch politicians, such as Balkenende, Bot and the main
opposition leader Mr. Bos, must simultaneously serve their
Eurosceptic crowd and find new allies abroad, such as the
United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, without needlessly
alienating a substantive minority of federalist Dutchmen and
representatives of the old axis of Germany and France. Even
if we assume a constructive role of Blair and Brown and a
less divisive role of Chirac and Schröder and their successors,
this balancing act requires a measure of imagination and
control of the new domestic politicisation of the European
question that is strikingly absent in the present leadership of
the Netherlands.
The European impact of the Dutch referendum is
pervasive: this denial of European unity did not happen in
Spain, but it can still happen everywhere else. It is also
manifold.
First, this was an accident waiting to happen since the
artificiality of élite consensus in national and European
diplomacy was widely covered by television and widely known
by the audience (such as the noncompliance with the Stability
and Growth Pact). Second, major steps of integration trigger
major unrest in society and major opposition in politics. From
now on, European integration is part and parcel of the normal
logic of domestic politics (leaving the special logic of foreign
policy behind). Third, generations of architects of Europe told
their national constituencies that they could smoothly integrate
while maintaining their old sense of national identity. Such
European “differentialism” is becoming obsolete. Whether
the present generation follows the low road of integration
(geo-economics, such as the Lisbon strategy of innovation),
or the high road (geo-politics, such as Solana’s security
doctrine), it has to publicly ask millions of voters to open up
and Europeanise their present national consciousness. Fourth,
renewal of public support of the EU cannot be attained by
merely restoring the Monnet-Delors guardianship of economic
problems. It must also include a European answer to
legitimate popular concerns about insecurity (terror, crime,
immigration, enlargement) and the shallow European promise
of security by consensus among weak heads of state. Fifth,
the most important element of the contested democratic deficit
of the EU is the failure of representation by national parties,
parliaments and party governments. European integration is
part of a new cleavage that may well shape a future creative
compromise about European (and global) preconditions of
national citizenship and welfare in a wide sense.
Finally, the lack of external trust in the proverbial Polish
plumber – that is, in human beings from new member states
and neighbour states of the EU – is intertwined with a lack of
internal trust among compatriots and citizens from different
old member states. As long as today’s constitutional framers
are not able or willing to break down the circle of populist
distrust and to build a circle of liberal trust, the Treaty of
Rome of 2004 remains brain dead. Without minimal solidarity,
the internal market and monetary union – twin towers of
European power – will collapse.
Jos de Beus is professor of political theory at the
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What Counts in This Crisis?
George Ross
THE FRENCH AND DUTCH REJECTIONS of the Constitution in late
spring 2005 have left the EU in a deep crisis involving its
legitimacy, failing EU institutional capacities, and new
problems confronting the consequences of enlargement. This
list is incomplete, however. A post-referendum survey of
France concluded that the “.. . reasons why people voted
“no”…are based chiefly on national and/or social
themes  which take precedence over European
considerations…”3  The Dutch rejection was more EU-
centered, but fully  21% of voters were worried about the
economic situation and 65% thought that rejection might “allow
for a renegotiation of the Constitution in order to place greater
emphasis on the more social aspects”.4  In parallel land
elections in North Rhine-Westphalia voters expressed deep
concern about similar social themes, as did German voters
more generally on September 18.  There may be another
important dimension to the EU’s “crisis,” therefore, connected
to deep “social model” anxieties in key member states.
Comparing EU and US economic performance is the
best place to begin.  EU data underline that the US grew
faster and had lower unemployment than the EU-15 and Euro-
Zone over the last decade and that there are also substantial
differences in social spending between EU members and the
US.5  This has encouraged the Wall Street Journal, The
Economist, and others to contend that American social policy
minimalism explains US success while European social “social
model” rigidities cause Europe’s problems. There are good
reasons to doubt this, however.  EU economies outside EMU
have sometimes done nearly as well as the US, indicating at
the very least that there may be a negative EMU effect at
work, whatever the social model issues. Smaller EU-15
members have often done better than larger ones, the UK
excepted, and this is particularly true for “smalls” with
generous “European” social models (Austria, Sweden,
Denmark, and, until 2001, the Netherlands).6 Finally, others
have not done well at all, first among them France and
Germany. 7  Germany is the largest economy in the EU,
accounting for 22% of its GDP in 2003, and perennially the
world’s leading exporter. France is the second or third largest
EU economy (the UK may be ahead, depending upon the
year) with 16% of EU GDP, and the fourth or fifth largest
exporter in the world. Each has had well over 10%
unemployment in recent years, chronic problems meeting
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) targets, slow growth in the
1990s, and very little growth at all since the turn of the new
century.
These facts bear witness to a different dimension of EU
crisis than those on the post-referendum list.  France and
Germany are together responsible for much of the EU’s
comparative economic decline since the early 1990s. Arguably,
without new strategies in both countries the Union will
continue to be economically hamstrung. The Union depends
on its member states in no area more than in economics where
it now has little leverage beyond a broken SGP, weak macro-
economic policy coordination, and endless exhortation about
the Lisbon Agenda from a Commission that has difficulty
being heard.
Things look even gloomier when one considers the political
circumstances surrounding these economic problems. Oft-
repeated claims that French difficulties represent refusal to
modernize, in particular in “social model” areas, are nonsense.
The French have frenetically reformed in social areas ever
since 1983 when François Mitterrand turned away from
“social democracy in one country” to renewing European
integration. The French economy has been liberalized, the
labor market has followed, and there have been major changes
in the substance and funding of welfare state policies.  The
outcomes of reform are troublesome, however, including labor
force reduction through early retirement and work-sharing,
insistence on standard employment contracts discouraging
flexible hiring, tax policies that deter job seeking, enhanced
insider-outsider divides, and employer reticence about new
hiring. There is irony here. Such outcomes are direct products
of major French efforts to make recent European integration
happen. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, France was a statist
country engaged in rapid liberalization and simultaneously a
high inflation-soft currency country abruptly shifting to price
stability, policy shifts that leaders deemed necessary to make
the Single Market and EMU happen.  As a corollary French
citizens have been obliged to pay the adjustment costs for
these shifts. France being democratic, politicians behind
renewed European integration knew that asking citizens to
accept greater insecurity would cause electoral problems.
This undoubtedly explains the particular outcomes of reform,
which the French themselves call the “social management”
of unemployment.
Why have the French connected their social model
anxieties to the EU?  Europhiles sometimes forget the many
promises made about European integration since the mid-
1980s.  Great payoffs of growth, prosperity, and
competitiveness would allegedly follow short-term suffering.
Results have been short of the promises, however.  After
twenty years, the French experience ever-greater inequality,
chronic mass unemployment, more poverty, squeezes on
cherished social programs, with no apparent end to demands
for retrenchment and reform.  The 2005 referendum on the
Constitution provided a catalyst for blowback, therefore,
structuring anxiety so that threats to the French “social model”
could be seen as coming from the EU itself, hence frenzy
about Polish plumbers, the equation of Bolkestein with
Frankenstein, and belated discovery from the Constitutional
Treaty that the EU had been busy liberalizing European
economies all along.  Blowback does little to solve the problem
of France’s weak economic position, however.
The German story is different, although it ends in similarly8     Fall  2005   EUSA Review
bleak conclusions.  Modell Deutschland cruised through the
“1992” years, doing well enough economically to serve as
the EU financier of last resort.  The economic burdens of
German unification ended this glorious period. The constraints
of EMU that followed unification underlined the consequences
of annually shifting 5% of GDP from West to East. Today, in
general conditions of slump – persistent mass unemployment
and low growth - Germany’s neo-corporatist industrial
relations system is now coming apart at its seams and growing
welfare state costs repeatedly challenge government budgets,
Unlike the French, however, the Germans have done very
little “social model” reforming at all until very recently.  As
things got worse in the 1990s the Kohl government sought
consensual change in a tri-partite “Alliance for Jobs” which
failed utterly. It then legislated small reforms that were quickly
repealed by the new Red-Green coalition after 1998. The
Red-Green coalition then called its own “Alliance for Jobs”
conclave, which also failed utterly.  Finally, in its second term,
the SPD-Green government bit the bullet with the Hartz and
2010 reforms. Germany’s institutions have been major barriers
to reform throughout. Both in political and devolved social
policy areas they were explicitly designed to promote
consensus and prevent abrupt change.  Thus when
governments have tried to legislate reforms they have paid
by losing election after election, the most recent example
being the fate of the Red-Green government.
The French ‘no’ signaled that parts of the French
electorate found “social model” reform promoted indirectly
through EU market liberalization unacceptable, whatever the
economic issue. The Germans, who were not asked to vote
on the Constitutional Treaty, made clear both in regional
elections and on September 18 that they do not want other
Germans to do serious “social model” reforming.  In neither
case is “Americanization” needed. Intelligent reforming could
preserve the outlines of existing social models and introduce
new ways to internalize external economic challenges. Still,
there are social model characteristics in both countries that
contribute to mass unemployment, economic stagnation,
welfare state programs that cost too much, and chronic failure
to meet EMU and SGP obligations.  What is really important,
however, is that in neither case are solutions in sight. In both
countries citizens are well mobilized to block changes, even
those that do not threaten their cherished social models. The
French are virtually certain to dither at least until the 2007
Presidential Elections, possible longer. A German Grand
Coalition with both large parties tied to a reformist mast might
open up to more reform, but institutional obstacles and popular
resistance are great.  Thus at the end of the day, paradoxes
abound.  The Convention-Constitution episode has failed and
the ever closer union for which many conventionnels quietly
prayed will have to wait. Despite this, repairing the EU’s
institutional plumbing should be possible, despite all the hand-
wringing.  But we should not overlook that the EU is primarily
a set of economic and market arrangements whose forward
progress largely depends on payoffs to citizens of new growth
and prosperity.  Incessant Commission rhetoric about the
Lisbon agenda notwithstanding, such payoffs depend on the
national actions of member states, and, in 2005, particularly
on the strategies France and Germany devise to confront
their present economic inanition. Without French and German
locomotives pulling the EU economic train the station will
remain far away.
George Ross is Morris Hillquit Professor in Labor and
Social Thought at Brandeis University
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Teaching Skills in European Integration Courses
Peter Bursens
European Integration within a Master in Interna-
tional Relations and Diplomacy
FOR A FEW YEARS NOW, European universities and Higher Edu-
cation institutions have been reorganizing their teaching pro-
grams to comply with the requirements of the Bologna Dec-
laration and successive agreements1. Many institutions took
this opportunity to introduce substantial reforms in the cur-
ricula as well. One major feature of these changes is an in-
creased emphasis on teaching practical skills next to theo-
retical understanding and empirical facts. Courses on Euro-
pean integration could not escape from this pedagogic turn in
academia. This contribution describes how such courses at
the University of Antwerp (UA) 2 have been recently re-
shaped, introducing more balance between knowledge and
skills.
At the University of Antwerp, the Department of Politi-
cal Science3 currently offers a Bachelor in Political Science
and a Master in International Relations and Diplomacy
(MAIRD), both (primarily) taught in Dutch. In both curricula,
courses on European Integration are included. This essay
deals with the MA level. The MAIRD is designed for stu-
dents holding an MA degree in the so-called ‘human sci-
ences’. Hence, students come from as different backgrounds
as political science, sociology, communication science, law,
economics, languages, philosophy, history, etc. Most of them
aspire to an international career in diplomatic services, inter-
national organizations or multinational corporations. In addi-
tion to the five core courses (Theory of International Rela-
tions, Diplomacy, International Economy, International Law
and Diplomatic History), students also receive a fair amount
of EU related courses. In four of those EU related courses –
European Integration, Seminar on European Integration,
Diplomatic Skills and Multi-level Governance, practical
skills take a prominent place.
The introduction of practical skills as a supplement to
theory and empirics follows from the guidelines of university’s
Teaching Development Plan (TDP)4. The TDP urges the
teaching staff to reform their teaching, starting from the is-
sue of which theoretical, attitudinal and practical competen-
cies students should acquire through a particular course (fol-
lowing the ‘tail wags the dog’ principal). With respect to Eu-
ropean Integration, these competencies were broadly defined
as the acquiescence of basic knowledge of European inte-
gration (history, institutions and policies), the development of
a critical attitude towards European developments and me-
dia-coverage of the EU, and practical skills such as writing,
debating, negotiating, and presenting and defending reports.
The courses presented in the next paragraphs are all examples
of how the more practical competencies were translated in
the course designs.
Debates, Simulations and Games
European Integration is the MA’s introductory course on
the EU. It provides students with basic knowledge of the
EU’s history, institutions, decision-making architecture, poli-
cies and contemporary developments. In terms of practical
competencies, this course seeks to develop debating skills.
The combination of both objectives has resulted in giving de-
bating exercises a central position in the course design. This
format was chosen to simulate real life situations in which
diplomats and international officials need to argue their posi-
tion or defend their ideas to superiors. Students are not tested
through traditional examinations, but through a series of prac-
tical debating assignments integrating tests on knowledge and
skills. All assignments are based on the development of argu-
ments in favor and against statements. Examples of such state-
ments include ‘The EU needs to renationalize its Common
Agricultural Policy’ and ‘The Member States should convene
a new Convention to discuss the future of the constitutional
project’. Students are asked to develop arguments both de-
fending and attacking the statements. These arguments are
to be presented in a paper and used in debating exercises.
The latter take place ‘live’ during classes, with fellow stu-
dents in the audience, and are moderated by the lecturer.
An interesting way to organize debates is to allocate roles
at random, triggering students to defend statements that run
against their personal opinion. Understanding the argumenta-
tion of adversaries is, of course, an important skill for future
diplomats. To multiply the exercise opportunities for students,
debates are also organized ‘virtually’ through the electronic
teaching platform Blackboard, again moderated by the lec-
turer5. To guide students through this innovative way of teach-
ing, they receive introductory courses on debating skills and
the use of Blackboard discussion fora. Finally, in this kind of
course design, it is important that the lecturer has very clear
ideas on evaluation criteria: students need to know what ex-
actly a ‘good’ argument is, how they are expected to show
that they master EU basics and recent developments, and
what skills and knowledge they need to show during the de-
bating examination.
Debating skills come close to, but are not the same as
negotiating skills. The latter also take a crucial place among
the MA’s envisaged competencies. To teach and exercise
Teaching the EU Editor’s note: This column is written by members of
EUSA’s “Teaching the EU” Interest Section. For
details about the Section and how to join, please
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negotiating skills more explicitly, the Antwerp MAIRD supple-
ments its courses in diplomacy with a course on Diplomatic
Skills, focusing on a negotiation simulation. This exercise has
got the mainstream design that is used in many other MA
programs in European Studies and International relations. In
Antwerp, several seminars are offered each year, simulating
fora such as the UN Security Council, NATO Ministerial Sum-
mits and EU Councils. Students need to choose one assign-
ment. The European seminar is developed in collaboration with
the Netherlands Institute for International Relations
Clingendael6.
In this exercise, students play the role of a Member State
or a European Institution and simulate negotiations on the Min-
isterial level. The staff offers students introductory courses
on diplomatic and negotiating skills, the specific decision-mak-
ing setting, and the topics under negotiation. Additional lec-
tures by practitioners (diplomats, politicians and/or civil ser-
vants) are recommended to enhance understanding of the real
professional context. Students need to prepare written posi-
tion papers and negotiation strategies. The exercise culmi-
nates in a one day event that simulates a European Council
meeting. Although the latter is ‘the’ simulation event, students
are urged to hold informal talks in the run-up to the final meet-
ing.
As it is the case with the debating skills, the evaluation of
negotiating skills is not an easy task. What is ‘effective’ nego-
tiation behavior? Can negotiation performances be weighed?
To give only one example: it is very tempting to grade asser-
tive and over-active behavior too high. Such an attitude may
not always be the most effective way to deal with negotia-
tions. But how do you evaluate silent but yet very strategic
behavior? In short, criteria should be developed very carefully
and communicated in detail to the participating students.
Negotiating skills take a central position in the program to
such an extent that they also make up a substantial part of the
Seminar on European Integration. This seminar is a follow-
up course on the introductory EU course and is meant for
those students who want to specialize in European Integra-
tion. It is organized for a small group (up to a maximum of 15
students) and the topic changes every year. From the 2005
onwards, the topic follows the theme of EUROSIM7. The
department’s membership of TACEUSS8 makes it possible
for the MAIRD students to participate in the internationally
organized EUROSIM simulations. In terms of course design,
this means that the seminar focuses on a detailed elaboration
of the simulation topic (which can range from enlargement to
IGCs to more detailed legislative proposals). The seminar cul-
minates in the participation in the transnational simulation. It
goes without saying that the internet is an even more impor-
tant tool in this international seminar. It should be stressed that
this transnational experience is much more than yet another
negotiating exercise.
The transnational setting offers a series of extra assets
for students aspiring to an international career. First of all,
students take a short, but intensive trip abroad. Secondly,
students practice foreign languages since both the seminar
at home and the international event take place in English.
Both aspects are crucial features in a program that is (un-
fortunately) still taught predominantly in Dutch. It is also
enthusiastically (and financially) supported by the teaching
and international relations departments of the university.
Thirdly, the contacts with foreign students, and more in par-
ticular with their culturally shaped negotiating behavior re-
sembles international reality much more than the purely do-
mestic exercises. In addition, each nationality is, of course,
much more able to collect first hand empirical data from its
respective capitals and diplomatic services. For many of the
students, it’s their first networking opportunity. In addition,
international co-operation also serves the lecturers since the
teaching workload can be divided and (teaching and re-
search) networks can be developed and maintained.
Finally, the course on Multi-level Governance (MLG)
goes one step beyond the more classic teaching of skills.
While traditional negotiation exercises are almost always
confined to a one day simulation of a single ministerial meet-
ing (and to the preparations, of course), the game developed
for the MLG course adds some extra dimensions. The MLG
course doesn’t exclusively focus on European integration.
Its core competency aims include an understanding of and
experiences with the complexity of public decision-making
as a result of the verticalization of politics. Recent develop-
ments make concepts such as federalism, regionalism,
intergovernmentalism, supranationalism and subsidiarity core
features in this course. A complex simulation game was
developed to make students experience the impact of mul-
tiple governance layers upon decision-making capacities of
single actors. Since the EU is the ultimate extra layer, it has
also become the main point of attention in the skill part of
the MLG course.
Taking the EU’s Regional Policy as a case, a dynamic
and more complex simulation game was developed. The
complex and dynamic features refer to the fact that not a
single event, but a series of consecutive events on several
levels is simulated. Students need not only to simulate the
European Council meeting that decides upon the budget, but
also the preliminary domestic negotiations on the national
positions (often taking into account the central-regional-lo-
cal relations) and the post-EU level decision phase of project
selection within the member States. A similar course design
as the one used for ‘ordinary’ simulations is used, yet in a
more complex version. The asset of such a complex game
is that it even more resembles the real context individual
actors are confronted with: officials, politicians and diplo-
mats often need to play simultaneous chess, i.e. they are
forced to deal with several levels at the same time.
One last feature running through all courses is the ex-
ercise of peer-commenting. All courses on European inte-
gration include one or more paper assignments. In general,12     Fall  2005   EUSA Review
Archive of European Integration
http://aei.pitt.edu
THE ARCHIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (AEI) is an online
repository for non-commercial, non-governmental
publications (short monographs, working or policy papers,
conference papers, etc.) dealing with any aspect of
European integration. The AEI is hosted by the
University Library System at the University of Pittsburgh
with the co-sponsorship of EUSA and the Center for
West European Studies/EU Center, University of
Pittsburgh. All those who presented papers in person at
the 2005 EUSA Conference in Austin may post their
conference papers on the AEI.
Anyone can access and download materials on the
AEI. The search engine allows searching by author, title,
keyword, year, etc. The AEI editors invite all with
appropriate papers to submit them to the AEI. If you
wish to deposit papers in a series, you must contact the
AEI editor before beginning deposit of papers. With
questions about the AEI, e-mail <aei@library.pitt.edu>.
papers are marked by the lecturer. In many cases, however,
the supervisor’s grading is supplemented by peer-grading.
Students are asked to comment on structural and content
related aspects of each other’s papers, hence more or less
creating a panel conference style of interaction and learning
context. However, in contrast to what usually happens, the
performance of the discussants is evaluated, rather than the
papers or the paper-presenters. That way, students are even
more stimulated to read each others’ work thoroughly and
provide colleagues with helpful comments and suggestions.
Assets, Suggestions and Pitfalls of Skill Teaching in
EU Studies
Most of the recent literature on pedagogical strategies
in higher education point out that, also on an academic level,
transferring knowledge must be supplemented with the train-
ing of real life skills. Several advantages are worth mention-
ing. First of all, theoretical knowledge is retained longer when
learned in a context that activates students. Reproduction is
much less efficient than having students perform themselves.
Teaching skills is not only an aim in itself, it also serves the
aim of knowledge transfer. Interactive teaching in small
groups, including discussion sessions and peer-grading, is a
necessary but only first step in this direction. The combina-
tion of teaching both content and skills allows for students to
deal actively with learning material. Inviting students to de-
velop arguments and to debate with each other, forces them
to understand the empirical facts and to apply their knowl-
edge in real life situations.
In this way, chances are not only bigger that the knowl-
edge itself remains acquired and active for a longer period,
but also skills related to team-work, debating and negotiat-
ing. Enriched with an international component, the real life
imitation becomes even more optimized. Organizations such
as EUROSIM and others are excellent opportunities to in-
troduce students to a transnational context. Also electronic
platforms such as Blackboard can be used effectively to de-
velop and evaluate students’ skills, in particular with respect
to debating.
While including skills without doubt adds an extra di-
mension to teaching European integration, some pitfalls should
be pointed out. First of all, teaching skills and knowledge
doesn’t decrease the staff’s workload. On the contrary, the
organization of debates, simulations and games causes extra
creative and administrative challenges that should be consid-
ered before starting. Secondly, students sometimes need to
be convinced that academic education is more than the trans-
fer of theoretical and factual knowledge. Innovative teach-
ing methods must be sold to ‘conservative’ students who like
to learn syllabi by heart, preferably only a few weeks before
examinations. Learning skills requires a more intensive and
continuous engagement. In the end, however, student’s course
evaluations point out that they highly appreciated the design.
Related to this is the uncertainty of how evaluation is carried
out. This brings me to a final point. Perhaps the most impor-
tant challenge for lecturers teaching skills and knowledge at
the same time, is the search for objective, quantifiable evalu-
ation criteria. The problems with grading traditional oral ex-
ams become even more manifest when grading debating or
negotiating behavior.
Peter Bursens is a Professor of  Political Science at the
University of Antwerp and Co-Chair of the EUSA
Interest Section on Teaching for 2005-2009
1 The Bologna Declaration seeks to introduce a European
Learning Area. It shapes the framework for reforms that
should make European Higher Education systems more in-
ternational and mutually compatible with the ultimate aim to
compete with the US. A useful overview and start page can
be found on: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/
2 http://www.ua.ac.be/
3 http://www.ua.ac.be/psw/
4 http://www.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=*ONW
5 http://blackboard.ua.ac.be/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp.
Guest access can be provided upon request.
6 http://www.clingendael.nl/
7 http://www.fredonia.edu/org/eurosim/
8 http://www.fredonia.edu/org/eurosim/taceuss/EUSA Review    Fall 2005   13
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Problems With Cross-Border Banking in Europe:
Positive and Negative Lessons from the
United States
David G. Mayes1
CREATING THE SINGLE market for financial services in Europe
continues to throw up a series of problems that frustrate
progress and present authorities with new challenges. Many
of these problems should not come as a surprise if one looks
at the history of financial integration in the US as an ex-
ample. Despite a head start of at least 150 years the US still
has anomalies and difficulties with the treatment of financial
markets and institutions that run across local legal borders. It
is very unlikely that anyone starting with a clean slate for a
system that will work well for a population of 300-400million
and a land area the size of the US or Europe would come up
with the US system any more than they would come up with
the European one.
One of the problems that has emerged recently is what
happens if a bank that operates in a number of countries
decides to take advantage of the European Company Statute
and headquarter itself in one country and operate in the oth-
ers through branches. Nordea, which is the most cross-bor-
der major bank in Europe has announced that it intends to do
just that. (Its structure is set out in Table 1.) Regulation of
banking in the single European financial market was set up
on the basis of trying to make sure that traditional regulation,
based on each of the national member states, did not restrict
the entry of institutions that were already licensed and trad-
ing in another country. Thus one member state (the host coun-
try) could not impede the entry of a bank licensed in another
(the home country), if it wanted to set up a branch. It would
be subject to local (host) regulation on how it ran its business,
but the regulation of how it managed its risks and operated as
a ‘safe’ bank would continue to be the responsibility of the
home country. If anything went wrong then the responsibility
would also lie with the home country, which would provide
insurance for the deposits and be responsible for winding it
up in single proceedings with all creditors and depositors
treated equally in their priority, regardless of their country of
location.
Such a scheme is fine if such operations remain small
and are not the norm, as was the case when the legislation
was introduced over the last 20 years or so: if a bank wanted
to operate in another jurisdiction on any scale then it would
set up a subsidiary and incorporate locally. In those circum-
stances the prudential regulation of the foreign operation would
become the responsibility of the host country. Thus the match
of where banks operated, who was responsible for them and
anything that went wrong would be reasonably close. This is
no longer true. Some bank branches have now reached a
Essay
size that they are of ‘systemic’ importance. ‘Systemic’ in this
context means that if they were to stop operating suddenly
the impact on the rest of the host financial system would be
sufficiently large that the authorities would feel the need to
intervene and reallocate and limit the losses in a socially ben-
eficial manner.
Intervention makes sense if one country is intervening in
a bank to handle systemic problems inside its own borders. It
is quite another to expect the authorities and taxpayers in one
country to intervene to help the financial system in another.
Yet this is what we are already asking in terms of EU regu-
lations. Although branches and subsidiaries differ in legal form
they do not necessarily differ in practical terms. Some
branches could operate as independent entities, whereas many
subsidiaries could not – many essential functions of being a
bank may be already undertaken in other parts of the bank-
ing group outside the country. Much of the point of mergers,
for example, is to get advantages from being able to concen-
trate functions and avoid duplications. New Zealand is one
country that has responded to concern by insisting first of all
that any systemic institution be first of all a subsidiary and not
a branch, and secondly that it does not outsource key func-
tions in a way that cannot enable them to be operating again
within the ‘day’ in which transactions need to be completed.
As it is, there is a major mismatch appearing in Europe
between who is responsible for supervising banks and who is
responsible for the stability of the financial system, which
means that the system is unlikely to work properly in prac-
tice. The US has faced major problems of this sort and re-
acted by trying to restrict the cross-border activity of banks
and setting up federal institutions such as the FDIC (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation).
The Niceties of Bank Exit
Before we can discuss what might make more sense in
a European environment to handle these issues, we need to
explore the details of how to handle a bank ‘exit’. (I use the
word exit rather than ‘failure’ because in the event of a prob-
lem with systemic institution the authorities need to find a
way of allowing the business to continue even if the failing
institution is terminated in legal personality.) This is an issue
that the US has directly addressed with FIDICIA, the FDIC
Improvement Act, as a result of the problems in the Savings
and Loans industry. Banks are not like other companies in
two important respects. First of all, they have financial rather
than physical assets, so that depositors and other creditors
can rush in at the first sniff of a problem and demand repay-
ment in an arbitrary first come first served manner, until the
assets run out. Banks cannot apply for a temporary stop or
protection against their creditors while they reorganize as
this in itself stops the process of functioning as a bank. Sec-
ond, whereas in other industries competitors are only too
pleased to see one of their number collapse as they can take
over the customers, in banking, the major banks are exposedEUSA Review    Fall 2005   15
to each other and to the consequences that a major failure
has in reducing asset prices. One collapse could easily lead
to another and to a general loss in confidence that brings
down the system.
It is thus essential for the authorities to intervene early
on, press very strongly for a market solution through recapi-
talization by the existing shareholders or merger or acquisi-
tion by a sound competitor, or if this fails, stop the process
before the losses mount. FIDICIA ensures this by a sequence
of Structured Early Intervention and Resolution involving
Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), ultimately involving the
compulsory takeover of the bank by the FDIC if the process
last too long and goes too far. The FDIC then has to resolve
the bank in the way that minimizes its losses. There is a fur-
ther reason why it is the FDIC that does this, and not some
other institution. First of all, it is the ordinary uninformed per-
son who as a depositor will not get to the bank fast enough to
withdraw their money before a collapse. Secondly, bankruptcy
is a long process which can last years. People cannot wait to
get at their bank accounts for a long period of time, even if
ultimately they get over 90 cents on the dollar. It would bring
too much of the financial system to a standstill and harm too
many ‘innocent’ voters. FIDICIA is thus a special public law
governing the insolvency of banks.
In Europe most countries do not have the same neatness
regarding their banking laws. On the whole, public law is not
used and the authorities have to petition the courts for bank-
ruptcy or take other steps to prevent the bank becoming in-
solvent. Moreover, there are major differences over the rules
and institutions among countries. Fifteen years ago many
countries did not even have deposit insurance and even if
they do have a deposit insurer, it may not have a role like the
FDIC does to step in and may have to take its place in the
queue for reimbursement from the receiver rather than run
the process. (The FDIC has 5,200 employees to run a sys-
tem in a country of nearly 300 million people. The Finnish
Deposit Insurer has one person part time for a country of 5
million, a difference of a factor of at least 100 in capability to
act if we take into account the relative size of deposits). While
all member states have to have deposit insurance up to mini-
mum level, there is wide variety among schemes beyond that,
so some are private and some public, some funded and some
not, the accounts covered are different etc.) The ability to
gain control of the assets of foreign banks is also different in
the US, which applies the principle of ‘territoriality’ so that it
can undertake separate insolvency proceeding for the assets
within its jurisdiction. The EU on the other hand applies the
principle of ‘universality’ and takes them together in single
proceedings.
Thus the EU cannot follow the New Zealand route of
applying territoriality, ensuring viable entities in their jurisdic-
tion and having the power to intervene early through public
law before losses mount. The EU therefore has to go the
other route – a joint and workable agreement among the par-
ties involved before the event - which is much harder to
achieve. It has to be able to get home and host country su-
pervisors to work together more effectively, so that they can
not only take joint responsibility for what they have done, but
also each has to have sufficient access to information about
the cross-border banks so that they can form a picture of the
risks to financial stability in their jurisdiction. If something
starts to go wrong they need agreement on the form of Prompt
Corrective Action and the responsibility for leading it. Some-
body needs to have responsibility for intervening and for mini-
mizing the losses – but they need to decide in advance whose
losses they are: depositors, GDP, taxpayers etc. There also
needs to be an agreement on burden sharing – how should
that be assessed, as the distribution of shareholders, deposi-
tors, employees, creditors, assets etc will all differ across the
various countries?
There are thus two major problems: a lack of power to
act and a danger of those who can act being unwilling or
unable to bear the losses. The Swiss, who have two very
large banks operating mainly in other countries in UBS and
Credit Suisse, have recognized this and put a cap of Sfr4bn
on any payout. However, they are not in the EU, where such
an action is not permitted. We could thus see examples of
banks being “too big to save” rather than the traditional “too
big to fail” and hence crises emerging.
A Way Forward
The natural response is to create a European level regu-
latory body. This is not on the cards for supervision, as it
would be a major undertaking and the large countries who
would be most affected are not facing the problem on the
same scale. However, perhaps some sort of resolution agency
or EDIC could be set up to manage problems in the same
mold as the FDIC. This has not really been discussed, al-
though the Deposit Insurance Directive has been opened up
for discussion by the European Commission. Most banks are
not a cross-border problem nor are they systemic, so this
does not need to be a grand entity - probably less than 30
banks fit into this group. The number is sufficiently small that
it could perhaps be done on a case by case basis, perhaps run
by the central banks as they have responsibility for avoiding
systemic problems. But the countries involved differ as do
the systems they would have to try to harmonize. Regulatory
harmonization is progressing steadily aided by the Lamfalussy
process and the formation of CEBS, the Committee of Euro-
pean Banking Supervisors, but it has a long way to go.
The Nordic-Baltic authorities are getting on with the job,
without waiting for a European level solution as they have to
be able to handle the reality of Nordea’s intentions. They
have a much easier task than most of Europe as they have a
history of working together (their regulatory cultures and
general approach to problems is similar but by no means iden-
tical, as their different reactions to the Nordic crises in the
early 1990s reveals) their regulation is fairly well harmonized.16     Fall  2005   EUSA Review